Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Truth value gaps, philosophy, logic: is an expression for the problem that occurs when a statement cannot be attributed to either of the two truth values "true" or "false". The reason for this may be that the statement is meaningless (not negatable), it refers to a future event or has a paradoxical formulation. See also truth values, truth value agglomerations, supervaluation, dialethism, paradoxes, future._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Hartry Field on Truth Value Gaps - Dictionary of Arguments
I 245 Truth-value gaps: Kripke (1975)(1): Kripke accepts temporarily indeterminate truth values up until the level has been assigned. >Indeterminacy, >Truth values, >Fixed points/Kripke, >Truth/Kripke. 1.Kripke, S. 1975. Outline of a theory of truth. Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 |